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Abstract
After three years of organizing the wireless and sensor
network security (WSNS) workshop, it is time for some ret-
rospection to the workshop objectives and the visible out-
come. This review is focusing on the the quality and per-
formance of the workshop. On the one hand, it represents
a good source to recapitulate recent research topics related
to security in wireless ad hoc and sensor networks. Addi-
tionally, it extrapolates future research directions that seem
to be interesting and challenging for forthcoming research
activities.
1. Introduction
Wireless networks have experienced an explosive growth
during the last few years. Nowadays, there is a large vari-
ety of networks spanning from the well-known cellular net-
works to non-infrastructure wireless networks such as mo-
bile ad hoc networks and sensor networks. Security issue is
a central concern for achieving secured communication in
these networks.
Beginning in 2005, a new workshop has been created fo-
cusing on security in wireless and sensor networks. The
workshop was named IEEE International Workshop on
Wireless and Sensor Networks Security (WSNS). Since its
first year, it has been help annually in conjunction with
IEEE International Conference on Mobile Ad-hoc and Sen-
sor Systems (MASS).
This one day workshop aims to bring together re-
searchers and practitioners from wireless and sensor net-
working, security, cryptography, and distributed computing
communities, with the goals of promoting discussions and
collaborations. We are interested in novel research on all as-
pects of security in wireless and sensor networks and trade-
off between security and performance such as QoS, depend-
ability, scalability, etc. In particular, the workshop primarily
focuses the following topics:
• Authentication and Access Control
• Cryptographic Protocol
• Experimental Studies
• Key Management
• Information Hiding
• Intrusion Detection and Response
• Privacy and Anonymity
• Secure Localization and Synchronization
• Security and Performance Tradeoff
• Security Policy and Enforcement Issues
• Security Protocols Design, Analysis and Verification
• Secure Routing/MAC
• Surveillance and Monitoring
• Trust Management
The objective of this paper is a retrospection to the first
workshops in this series. We present a short summary of
the received and presented research issues. Based on this
review, we outline the most challenging questions in the
domain of security in wireless and sensor networks. Addi-
tionally, we provide suggestions and recommendations for
further research in this area.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In sec-
tion 2, we revisit the first WSNS workshops and provide
some statistics about papers and participation. Then, in sec-
tion 3, the addressed research field in the domain of secu-
rity in wireless and sensor networks is summarized. Finally,
section 4 concludes the paper with some recommendations
for future research in the area of WSNS.
2. WSNS - A Retrospection
The first three events of WSNS taking place in Wash-
ington DC, USA (2005), Vancouver, Canada (2006), and
Pisa, Italy (2007) turned out to be extremely successful in
terms of the quality of submitted papers, the participation
at the conference, and the broad range of addressed topics
– nevertheless still precisely focused on security in wireless
networks.
Table 1 outlines the evolution of the paper submissions,
accepted papers, and the according acceptance ratios (in
2005, one invited paper has been organized). The interest
from the community in wireless and sensor network secu-
rity is obviously growing. Fortunately, the workshop was
able to keep the acceptance ratio at a level that also allows
intensive discussions about ongoing work in a relaxed at-
mosphere.
year submitted accepted ratio
2005 26+1 12 0.44
2006 24 11 0.45
2007 33 14 0.42
Table 1. Overview to acceptance ratio of
WSNS over the last years.
Regarding the workshop community, it turned out that
people came from all over the world. In 2006, people from
nine countries presented their papers at the workshop. In
2007, people from ten countries from all over Europe, Asia,
and North America got accepted their papers. The program
of WSNS always included a keynote speech from some
well-known researcher in the field.
Questioning the lessons learned in three years WSNS,
we particularly need to mention the specific contributions
of the presenting authors in varioous field fo sensor network
security. In the next section, we outline these domains and
review the presented papers.
3. Research Issues in Wireless and Sensor Net-
works Security
The objective of this section is to review the main re-
search domains in wireless and sensor networks security
that have been addressed in the past years. This review can
be used in two ways. First, it provides a good summary
of recently published approaches and solutions to problems
related to wireless security. Thus, anyone starting research
in this domain will become a broad overview to the current
state of the art in this area. Secondly, the overview provides
detailed references to specific research item that also show
open issues to be addressed in further work.
3.1. Identified research domains
Before introducing individual contributions, we first
summarize the research domains addressed by WSNS pa-
pers in the last three years. In particular, the following three
domains have been addressed:
• Key management – Key management is still one of the
most challenging issues in ad hoc networks. The ques-
tion is how do multiple nodes establish shared keys and
how they can revoke keys if necessary.
• Performance and scalability – Focusing on low re-
source sensor networks, the performance of secure
communication protocols and cryptographic algo-
rithms needs to be considered for protocol engineering
and for developing secure applications.
• Access control and authentication – Access control
and authentication in wireless networks is difficult
as usually no complex security architectures such as
IPSec or Kerberos are available.
• Security protocols – Agreement protocols and inte-
grated reliability and security measures are needed in
distributed low resource networks.
• Routing and clustering – Ad hoc routing in wireless
networks requires countermeasures against two differ-
ent threats. First, selfish nodes exhaust resources from
the entire network without delivering any service and,
secondly, routing protocols can be attacked to eaves-
drop information packets.
• Secure localization – Localization is a major research
issue in ad hoc and sensor networks. If no security
measures are integrated, this essential component can-
not be trusted.
• Intrusion detection – Attacks such as address spoofing,
denial of service, and general misbehavior need to be
detected early in order not to spend too much resources
for transporting attack packets.
3.2. Key management
Key pre-distribution is usually preferred in mobile ad
hoc networks compared to other key management solu-
tions. The problem of this pre-distribution is the possi-
bility that the static keys got compromised. Several solu-
tions have been proposed to keep the impact of key dis-
closure small. In a key pre-distribution scheme for mobile
ad hoc networks based on set systems with limited inter-
section sizes, the probability that a huge amount of nodes
share the same pre-distributed key is minimized using set
system [20]. Differently, the asynchronous random key pre-
distribution (ARPD) approach [2] is focusing on random-
ized schemes for efficient operation in larger networks.
Based on this idea of random key pre-distribution, state-
based key management [27] additionally exploits the de-
ployment knowledge in sensor networks, the state of sen-
sors, in order to remove unnecessary key assignments. This
approach greatly improves the performance of the key man-
agement. Focusing on sensor networks, hierarchical so-
lutions may further improve key management. The level-
based key management for in-network processing in sensor
networks [13]. It uses a hierarchy to efficiently detect and to
mitigate Byzantine behavior. The communication behavior
in sensor networks – usually, sensors transfer the measure-
ment data towards a base station using a tree-like structure
– can also be exploited for key management. According to
the hierarchies established by the communication tree, keys
can be generated accordingly [6].
For group communication, often contributory group key
agreement protocols are used. The applicability in mobile
ad hoc networks has been investigated resulting in solution
specific to ad hoc networks [21]. In a related approach, ran-
dom key pre-distribution as mentioned before is extended to
provide authenticated key exchange with group support for
sensor networks [34].
Specific solutions for key management in ad hoc net-
works such as the non-interactive key agreement and pro-
gression (NIKAP) protocol [16] show the broad application
range and the complex requirements on key management
schemes in wireless networks.
Key management is not only about key distribution. An-
other important aspect is key revocation. With the gateway
subset difference revocation (GSDR) [26] mechanism, a so-
lution for efficient grouping of receivers based upon orga-
nizational characteristics while simultaneously introducing
the ability to audit rekey and data transmission has been
proposed.
3.3. Performance and scalability
Discussing security in wireless networks, it is evidently
necessary to analyze the performance and the scalabil-
ity of proposed solutions, especially if considering low-
resource networks such as sensor networks. The perfor-
mance of cryptographic algorithms has been evaluated on
sensor nodes in order to provide precise data to be used
in simulation experiments and for general protocol design
in this domain [28]. Similarly, the energy consumption of
security algorithms has been investigated [4]. The cost of
security measures also needs to be analyzed in much larger
contexts. For example, the performance of ZigBee key ex-
change has been investigated in 802.15.4 beacon enabled
clusters [11].
Besides measurements, the design of security solu-
tions that explicitly focus on energy efficient operation in
strongly demanded for use in sensor networks. Two exam-
ples discussed at WSNS are C4W, an energy efficient public
key cryptosystem for sensor networks [10] and a work on
security and energy considerations for routing in hierarchi-
cal optical sensor networks [25].
3.4. Access control and authentication
With the wide acceptance of pervasive computing solu-
tions, location-based applications and services are becom-
ing popular. The access to such services can nevertheless
still not considered secure. The most challenging issue
is access control. Location-based network access control
(LBAC) is a promising solution for use in WLAN environ-
ments [7].
An interesting method for peer identification in wireless
networks is based on signal properties [33]. Basically, the
estimated peer location and some contributing parameters
are exploited for proper identification and, thus, authentica-
tion.
Similar to nodes, messages need to be authenticated.
This is specifically a requirement for queries in sensor net-
works. n-layers query authentication in sensor networks (n-
LQA) [30] ensures that, in the presence of less than n cap-
tured nodes, unauthorized queries are stopped after a small
number of hops.
3.5. Security protocols
If sensor nodes cannot be hardened to persist any at-
tack, agreement protocols can be used to explicitly tolerate
a number of malicious nodes in sensor networks [1]. Ap-
plication scenarios and experiences from a practical imple-
mentation of an agreement protocol have been reported.
Looking at secure communication protocols, a number
of evaluations have been published that focus on various as-
pects of communication in wireless and sensor networks.
For example, the MAC layer security in 802.15.4 networks
has been deeply investigated [22]. Additionally, the sen-
sor network encryption protocol (SNEP) has been formally
analyzed [36]. From this example – a possible attack that
may lead to unauthenticated access to confidential data in
the network – it can be seen that formal protocol analysis is
strongly required in this domain.
The unreliability of wireless communication has been
continuously addressed in the wireless communications
community. Specific solutions that also incorporate secu-
rity measures in this investigation are for example the reli-
able and semi-reliable communication with authentication
(RAC) algorithm [8] and the fast and efficient secure com-
munication establishing mechanisms in aero-wireless envi-
ronments [12].
A system security solution in form of a middleware plat-
form has been developed to defend against communication
based attacks. It primarily focuses on the maintenance of
functional module integrity in sensor networks [29].
3.6. Routing and clustering
Secure routing in ad hoc networks is essential because
wireless ad hoc networks are specifically exposed to a num-
ber of threats such as attacks on the routing protocol. At
WSNS, two solutions for secure routing have been pro-
posed. First, the reputed authenticated routing for ad hoc
network protocols (Reputed-ARAN) [19] represents an ex-
tension to the ARAN protocol that is well-known in the ad
hoc community. Reputed-ARAN specifically addresses the
problem of selfish nodes. Secondly, the trust based routing
approach in ad hoc networks [24] focuses on a trust estab-
lishment scheme that exploits trust and confidence as key
metrics.
Besides the development of secure routing protocols, the
formal security analysis is a crucial component for secure
protocol design and analysis. A flexible and mathematically
rigorous formal model to analyze the security of wireless
sensor network routing protocols has been proposed and
tested for the security proof of a specific link-state routing
protocol [3]. It has been demonstrated that formal reasoning
with respect to routing security is highly beneficial.
A great number of helper function are necessary for var-
ious routing protocols. Examples include clustering tech-
niques such as the grouping-based clustering routing pro-
tocol for wireless networks [37], topology control mecha-
nisms for secured coverage in sensor networks [9], and se-
cure k-connectivity properties in sensor networks [14].
3.7. Secure localization
The capability of wireless networks to exploit the com-
munication capabilities for localization is often controver-
sially discussed in the context of location privacy. Location
based services usually fail to provide sufficient location pri-
vacy to its users. Therefore, complex solutions have been
proposed based on cryptographic mechanisms to establish
blind signatures. An example for a registration protocol that
ensures complete protection of the users personality while
providing authorization to particular services was presented
at WSNS [17]. Location tracking is not only possible by
relying on received wireless communication signals. Also,
the principles of ad hoc routing can be exploited for loca-
tion tracking attacks. The principles of using topology in-
formation for precise node localization have been discussed
at WSNS [5].
On the other hand, also the localization process needs to
be secured in order to prevent attacks against the network
infrastructure or against location-based services. Secure lo-
calization (SeLoc) for sensor and actor networks [18] is an
approach that relies on the passive reception of authentica-
tion messages. It provides means of verifying the localiza-
tion procedure and to improve the localization accuracy.
Similarly, a location verification scheme using secure
distance bounding protocols [32] has been proposed to pre-
vent attacks against location-based authentication schemes.
3.8. Intrusion detection
Finally, intrusion and misbehavior detection needs to be
mentioned as a key objective of security solutions in wire-
less and sensor networks. A good example for attack de-
tection in such networks is the cross-layer based intrusion
detection system (CIDS) for use in wireless ad hoc net-
works [35]. It tries to mitigate denial of service attacks
that prevent authorized users from gaining access to the
network. Link layer (collisions) and network layer (packet
drop misdirection) measures are used in combination to de-
tect such attacks.
An artificial immune system based approach for misbe-
havior detection has been investigated in order to evaluate
the impact of packet injection models on the misbehavior
detection performance [31]. Such solutions are of interest
as they provide insight into the traffic pattern in real sensor
networks.
Address spoofing is an eminent issue in wireless net-
works as many authentication schemes rely on correct ad-
dress information. At WSNS, a light-weight detection of
spoofing attacks in wireless networks was presented [15].
Finally, a distributed node revocation approach based on
cooperative security has been proposed [23]. Its main objec-
tive is the exclusion of compromised or misbehaving nodes
from the normal network operation.
4. Conclusion
As can be seen from this retrospection, the IEEE Inter-
national Workshop on Wireless and Sensor Networks Secu-
rity (WSNS) has become a interesting event well recognized
in the community. According to the received contributions
from all around the world, authors see this workshop as a
place to discuss high quality research. Thus, WSNS be-
come a forum for all security interested people working in
the fields of wireless and sensor networks.
Recently, the trend towards improved service quality
in wireless networks raised major interest in the wireless
networking domain. Buzzwords are low-latency network-
ing, delay and disruption tolerant networking, and zero-loss
communication. All the techniques developed in these ar-
eas have not yet considered to be integrated with security
measures. So, new research objectives can be set in these
directions.
Additionally, future research issues will still need to fo-
cus on the topics reviewed in this retrospection. Secure
communication, key management, attack detection, and
other issues are not yet solved properly. It seems that ap-
plication and scenario dependent solutions are required, es-
pecially in low resource sensor networks.
WSNS will continue to support the exchange of ideas
among interested researchers by providing the right forum
and the right environment. We are looking forward to re-
ceiving comments, suggestions, and, of course, contribu-
tions.
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